Attack vulnerability of power systems under an equal load redistribution
  model by Gulcu, Talha Cihad et al.
IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING, VOL. X, NO. X, 2018 1
Attack vulnerability of power systems under an
equal load redistribution model
Talha Cihad Gulcu, Vaggos Chatziafratis, Yingrui Zhang, and Osman Yag˘an
Abstract—This paper studies the vulnerability of flow networks
against adversarial attacks. In particular, consider a power
system (or, any system carrying a physical flow) consisting of
N transmission lines with initial loads L1, . . . , LN and capacities
C1, . . . ,CN , respectively; the capacity Ci defines the maximum
flow allowed on line i. Under an equal load redistribution model,
where load of failed lines is redistributed equally among all
remaining lines, we study the optimization problem of finding
the best k lines to attack so as to minimize the number of
alive lines at the steady-state (i.e., when cascades stop). This
is done to reveal the worst-case attack vulnerability of the
system as well as to reveal its most vulnerable lines. We derive
optimal attack strategies in several special cases of load-capacity
distributions that are practically relevant. We then consider
a modified optimization problem where the adversary is also
constrained by the total load (in addition to the number) of the
initial attack set, and prove that this problem is NP-Hard. Finally,
we develop heuristic algorithms for selecting the attack set for
both the original and modified problems. Through extensive
simulations, we show that these heuristics outperform benchmark
algorithms under a wide range of settings.
Index Terms—Flow networks; cascading failures; vulnerabil-
ity; optimal attack strategies
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks that carry or transport physical commodities,
e.g., electricity/water/gas distribution networks and road/public
transportation networks, have been an integral part of our
daily lives for decades. For example, our quality of life
largely depends on the continuous availability of an electrical
power supply. This dependence is expected to be further
amplified in the near future due to the increasing market
share of electric vehicles and increasing integration of major
national infrastructures to the power grid; e.g., water, transport,
communications, etc. All of these point to a future where
the reliability of the flow networks will be paramount, with
the central research question being how we can design these
networks in a robust and reliable manner. In the rest of
the paper, we focus our attention on power systems for
concreteness, but most of the discussion applies generally to
any transport system.
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A major problem with existing power systems is the seem-
ingly unexpected large scale failures. Although rare, the sheer
size of such failures has proven to be very costly, at times
affecting hundreds of millions of people [2], [21], [28]; e.g.,
the recent blackout in India [34]. Such events are often
attributed to a small initial shock getting escalated due to
intricate dependencies within a power system [3], [27], [11].
This phenomenon, also known as cascade of failures, has the
potential of collapsing an entire power system as well as other
infrastructures that depend on the power grid [8], [16], [29].
Thus, understanding the dynamics of failures in power systems
and mitigating the potential risks are critical for the successful
development and evolution of many critical infrastructures.
In this paper, we continue our study of the robustness
of power systems under a simple model based on equal
redistribution of flow upon the failure of a power line. Namely,
we consider a power system with N transmission lines with
initial loads L1, . . . , LN and capacities C1, . . . ,CN . If a line
fails (for any reason), its load is assumed to be redistributed
equally among all lines that are alive. Thus, the load carried
by a line i may exceed its initial value Li over time due to
load redistribution. The capacity Ci defines the maximum flow
allowed on the line i, meaning that if the load carried by i
exceeds this capacity at any time, the line will be tripped (i.e.,
disconnected) by means of automatic protective equipments
so as to avoid costly damages to the system. Subsequently,
the load that was carried by line i before failure will be
redistributed to remaining lines, which in turn may cause
further failures, possibly leading to a cascade of failures.
The equal load redistribution model gets its appeal from
its ability to capture the long-range [7], [19] nature of the
Kirchhoff’s law, at least in the mean-field sense, as opposed
to the topological models [5], [14], [26] where failed load
is redistributed only locally among neighboring lines. For
example, it was suggested by Pahwa et al. [19] that equal load
redistribution is a reasonable assumption1 especially under the
DC power flow model; the DC model is known [17], [24] to
approximate the AC model well in many cases. With these
in mind, an important goal is to understand the robustness of
systems under the equal load redistribution model described
above against random and targeted attacks. The former case
was studied by Yag˘an [29] under the assumptions that initial
loads L1, . . . , LN are independent and identically distributed
1The equal load redistribution model is also similar in spirit to the well-
studied CASCADE model introduced in [8], [9]. There, upon failure of a line,
a fixed amount ∆ of load is redistributed to all functional lines irrespective
of the load being carried by the failed line or the number of remaining lines.
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with PL(x) = P [L ≤ x] and that capacities are given by
Ci = (1 + α)Li, i = 1, . . . , N,
where α > 0 denotes the tolerance factor; in [29] all lines as-
sumed to have the same tolerance factor. There, the robustness
of the system against random attacks that target a p-fraction
of the lines was studied; system robustness was quantified by
the final (i.e., steady-state) fraction n∞(p) of non-failed lines.
Among other results, it was shown that the system robustness
is maximized if all lines are given the same initial load, for a
given fixed mean load E [L].
Recently, Zhang and Yag˘an [36] extended the results in
[29] to the more general case where lines can have varying
tolerance parameters. Namely, they let
Ci = Li + Si, i = 1, . . . , N,
with Si denoting the free-space (or, redundancy) available at
line i. The tolerance factor, given by αi = Si/Li , may now vary
from one line to another. Under the assumption that load-‘free
space’ pairs (Li, Si) are independent and identically distributed
with PLS(x, y) = P [L ≤ x, S ≤ y], they studied the robustness
against random attacks that target a p-fraction of the lines.
Their main result is that, with the mean values E [L] and
E [S] are fixed, n∞(p) is uniformly maximized for all p values
if all nodes are given the same free space E [S], regardless of
how the loads are distributed. This leads to the counterintuitive
conclusion that lines with higher initial load shall be assigned
smaller tolerance factors to maximize robustness and raises
the possibility that the widely used (both in academy and
industry) setting of equal tolerance factor is not optimal for
system robustness (as far as the metric n∞(p) is concerned).
With the case of random attacks being well-understood, we
shift our attention in this paper to understanding the vulner-
ability of power systems under targeted attacks. As before,
the main goal would be to derive design strategies (in the
form of optimal load-‘free space’ distributions) that would lead
to maximum robustness, this time against a knowledgeable
adversary attacking a carefully selected set of lines. However,
for this optimization problem to be well-defined one has to
have a good understanding of the problem from an adversary’s
perspective. With this in mind, this paper aims to develop
good attack strategies that lead to maximal damage to the
system for a given number of lines that can be attacked. The
solution to the optimal attack problem will also help a system
designer by i) revealing the worst-case attack vulnerability of
the system which can help evaluate a given system design; and
ii) revealing the most vulnerable lines in the system that will
potentially be targeted by adversaries; this may then provide
useful design guidelines for improving system robustness.
Formally, we consider the following optimization prob-
lem. Given N lines with loads L1, . . . , LN and free spaces
S1, . . . , SN , we seek to find the optimal set A of k lines that
the adversary should attack in order to minimize the final
number n∞(A) of alive lines. We provide optimal solutions
via greedy algorithms in three special cases: i) when all lines
have the same load; ii) when Si = αLi for each i = 1, . . . , N
(as commonly used in the literature [5], [11], [13], [14], [26],
[29]); and iii) when all lines have the same free space, i.e.,
when S1 = · · · = SN . The last case is of particular interest as
it is known to lead to maximum robustness against random
attacks. For general cases of load-‘free-space’ distribution
PLS , we develop heuristic attack algorithms and show via
simulations that these outperform benchmark attack strategies.
In particular, we show that attacking the lines with the largest
Load × Free-space (L ∗ S) is in general a good strategy.
Parametrized attack strategies targeting the lines with the
largest L ∗ Sβ are also considered where β is in [0,∞], and
optimum choices for β are provided in several cases.
We also consider a variation of the problem with an addi-
tional constraint on the total load of the lines attacked; i.e.,
when the adversary is further constrained with
∑
i∈A Li ≤ Q
for some Q. From a practical point of view, this might be
the case if high-load carrying lines are protected better by the
network owner and the cost of attacking them is proportional
to their load. We show that this variation of the optimal attack
problem is in fact NP-Hard, meaning that no polynomial-
time algorithm can find the set A that minimizes n∞(A),
unless P ≡ NP. Our proof is based on a polynomial time
reduction from the k-Subset Sum problem, i.e., the problem
that seeks to find whether a sequence of integers has a subset
of size k whose sum equals Q. For the modified optimization
problem, we develop several heuristic algorithms and evaluate
their performance in comparison with benchmarks through
an extensive simulation study. In particular, we modify the
previously developed heuristics with a switch that, when
actuated during a sequential selection of lines to be attacked,
changes the way algorithm makes the remaining selections;
this idea is inspired from heuristics developed in [12] for
the multi-dimensional 0-1 Knapsack problem. Among other
things, we demonstrate via simulations that the max-L ∗ S
algorithm with a switch performs well in a range of settings.
We believe that our results will shed some light on the
vulnerability of power systems against powerful adversaries
launching targeted attacks. In particular, we expect them to
capture the qualitative properties of a power system well. This
work may also have applications in other fields. In particular,
the model considered here might be relevant for any flow
network that is responsible for carrying (or, transporting) a
physical quantity. A particularly interesting application is the
study of traffic jams in roads [20], where the capacity of a
line is regarded as the traffic flow capacity of a road.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe
the system model in Section II. In Section III, we survey the
results in [36] concerning robustness against random attacks.
We start our discussion on optimal attack strategies in Section
IV by demonstrating that certain greedy algorithms fail to give
the optimal solution in general. In Section V we consider some
special cases of interest where greedy algorithms are shown
to find optimal attack sets. In Section VI we prove a hardness
result showing that a variation of the optimal attack problem
is NP-Hard. Finally, in Section VII, we develop heuristic
algorithms for both the original and the modified optimization
problems and present a detailed numerical study comparing
the performance of our heuristics with benchmark algorithms
such as max-S, max-L, max-C, and random attacks.
The random variables (rvs) under consideration are defined
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on the probability space (Ω, F , P), where P denotes the proba-
bility measure. We denote the expectation operator by E. The
indicator function of an event E is denoted by 1 [E]. We write
|A| for the cardinality of a discrete set A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a power system with N transmission lines
L1, . . . ,LN with initial loads (i.e., power flows) L1, . . . , LN .
The capacity Ci of a line Li defines the maximum power flow
that it can sustain, and is given by
Ci = Li + Si, i = 1, . . . , N, (1)
where Si denotes the free-space (or, redundancy) available to
line Li . The capacity of a line is typically written [14], [26],
[13], [5] as a factor of the line’s original load, i.e.,
Ci = (1 + αi)Li
with αi > 0 defining the tolerance parameter for line Li .
Put differently, the free space Si is often given in terms of
the initial load Li with Si = αiLi . It is assumed that a line
fails (i.e., outages) if its load exceeds its capacity at any given
time. In that case, the load it was carrying before the failure
is redistributed equally among all remaining lines.
The main question of interest is to characterize the robust-
ness of this power system against i) random attacks that result
initially with a failure of a (randomly selected) p-fraction of
the lines; and ii) targeted attacks that initially fail a specific set
A of lines. The initial set of failures lead to redistribution of
power flows from the failed lines to alive ones (i.e., non-failed
lines), so that the load on each alive line becomes equal to its
initial load plus its equal share of the total load of the failed
lines. This may lead to the failure of some additional lines due
to the updated flow exceeding their capacity. This process may
continue recursively, generating a cascade of failures, with
each failure further increasing the load on the alive lines, and
may eventually result with the collapse of the entire system.
Throughout, let n∞(p) denote the final fraction of alive
lines when a p-fraction of lines is randomly attacked. The
robustness of the power system can be evaluated [29], [36]
by the behavior of n∞(p) as the attack size p increases, and
particularly by the critical attack size p? at which n∞(p) drops
to zero. In the case where a specific set A of lines are attacked,
we define n∞(A) as the final number of alive lines. The main
goal of this paper is to seek optimal attack strategies, i.e., to
find the set A of lines that minimizes n∞(A) under certain
constraints; e.g., the size |A| being fixed.
The equal flow redistribution model is inspired by the
democratic fiber bundle model [1], [6], where N parallel fibers
with random failure thresholds C1, . . . ,CN (i.e., capacities)
drawn independently from PC(x) share equally an applied total
force of F; see also [20], [22]. This model has been recently
adopted by Pahwa et al. [19] in the context of power systems
with F corresponding to the total load that N power lines
share equally. The formulation considered here, introduced in
[29], [36], differs from the original democratic fiber-bundle
model in that i) we do not assume that the total load of the
system is fixed at F; and ii) we allow for power lines to
carry different initial loads; see also [18]. In addition, [19] is
concerned with failures in the power system that are triggered
by increasing the total force (i.e., load) applied. Instead, our
formulation allows analyzing the robustness of the system
against external attacks or random line failures, which are
known to be the source of system-wide blackouts in many
interdependent systems [3], [32], [35].
III. RELEVANT WORK: EVALUATING AND OPTIMIZING
ROBUSTNESS AGAINST RANDOM ATTACKS
We now survey the results obtained by Zhang and Yag˘an
[36], [29] on the robustness of power systems under equal load
redistribution of loads. These works consider the problem from
a defender’s perspective and provide means to characterize
and optimize the robustness of the system, assuming that the
adversary will launch a random attack to a certain fraction
of lines. With the randomness involved in the attack model,
as well as load-capacity values, [29], [36] rely on mean-field
analysis to characterize the mean performance of the system
in the asymptotic regime where N approaches infinity.
Throughout this section, assume that the pairs (Li, Si) are
independently and identically distributed with PLS(x, y) :=
P [L ≤ x, S ≤ y] for each i = 1, . . . , N . The corresponding
probability density is given by pLS(x, y) = ∂2∂x∂yPLS(x, y).
We assume that L ≥ Lmin > 0 and S > Smin > 0 with
probability one, and that the marginal densities pL(x) and
pS(y) are continuous on their support.
A. Final system size as a function of the attack size
The main result in [36] characterizes the robustness of
power systems under any distribution of initial load L and
free space S, and any attack size p.
Theorem 3.1 ([36]): Let L and S denote generic random
variables following the same distribution with initial loads
L1, . . . , LN , and free space S1, . . . , SN , respectively. Then, with
x? denoting the smallest solution of
P [S > x] (x + E [L | S > x]) ≥ E [L]
1 − p (2)
over x ∈ (0,∞], the final system size n∞(p) is given by
n∞(p) = (1 − p)P
[
S > x?
]
. (3)
An intuitive explanation of this result is that x?, defined as
the smallest solution of (2), gives the extra load each alive line
has to carry (in addition to their initial load) at the steady-state;
(3) is then understood easily since a line will still be alive at
the steady-state if i) it is not targeted initially; and ii) it has
enough free-space to handle the extra x? amount of load.
For a graphical solution of n∞(p), one shall plot
P [S > x] (x + E [L | S > x]) as a function of x, and draw a
horizontal line at E [L] /(1− p) on the same plot. The leftmost
intersection of these two lines gives the operating point x?,
from which we can compute n∞(p) = (1− p)P [S > x?]. When
there is no intersection, we set x? = ∞ and understand that
n∞(p) = 0; e.g., see Figure 1.
Theorem 3.1 enables computing n∞(p) as a function of
p, thereby helping understand the response of the system to
attacks of varying magnitude. It also enables computing the
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Fig. 1. We see the variation of final system size n∞(p) as a function of the
(random) attack size p when loads are drawn independently and uniformly from
the range [Lmin, Lmax] = [10, 50], and free spaces are given by Si = αLi .
Red (lower) curve stands for α = 0.2, whereas blue (upper) curve represents
α = 1.2. For α = 0.2, we observe an abrupt first-order transition of n∞(p) as
it suddenly jumps to zero at p? = 0.0625, while decaying linearly as 1 − p
up until that point. A slightly different behavior is seen when α = 1.2 in that
n∞(p) exhibits a continuous divergence from the 1 − p line before complete
system failure, which again takes place through a discontinuous transition.
critical attack size p?, defined as the largest attack the system
can sustain. More precisely, we define
p? = sup
p>0
n∞(p) > 0,
so that for any attack with size p > p?, the system undergoes
a complete breakdown leading to n∞(p) = 0. The next result
provides a closed form expression for the critical attack size.
Theorem 3.2 ([36]): The critical attack size p? is given by
p? = 1 − E [L]
max
x
{P [S > x] (x + E [L | S > x])} . (4)
The operational usefulness of p? derives in part from its ability
to quantify the system robustness by a single scalar, paving
the way to designing the system with optimal robustness by
means of maximizing p?; see Section III-B below.
An interesting question here is whether n∞(p) decays to
zero continuously (i.e., through a second-order transition),
or discontinuously (i.e., through a first-order transition). The
practical significance of this is that continuous transitions
suggest a more stable and predictable system behavior with
respect to attacks, whereas with discontinuous transitions,
system behavior becomes more difficult to predict based on
past data. In [36], it was shown that the total breakdown of the
system will always be through a first-order (i.e., discontinuous)
transition under random attacks. More precisely, it was shown
that n∞(p?) > 0, while by definition it holds that n∞(p?+ε) =
0 for any ε > 0 arbitrarily small. This shows that despite its
simplicity, the equal flow redistribution model can capture real-
world phenomena of unexpected large-scale system collapses;
i.e., cases where seemingly identical attacks/failures leading
to entirely different consequences. In addition, depending
on system parameters, the first-order breakdown may have
early indicators at smaller attack sizes such as a diverging
failure rate leading to a non-linear decrease in n∞(p). In other
cases, the system abruptly transitions to a total collapse while
perfectly resisting attacks until the critical point; see Figure
1 and [36, Fig. 2] for the rich transition behavior that can be
observed under the equal load redistribution model.
B. Achieving Optimal Robustness
An important question from a system designer’s perspective
is concerned with deriving the universally optimum distribu-
tion of initial loads L1, . . . LN and free spaces S1, . . . , SN when
the mean values E [L] and E [S], respectively, are fixed. The
results obtained in [36] concerning this are presented next.
Theorem 3.3 ([36]): For any initial load-free space distribu-
tion, it holds that
p? ≤ E [S]
E [S] + E [L] =
E [S]
E [C] = p
?
dirac (5)
where p?dirac denotes the critical attack size when the free-
space follows a Dirac-delta distribution, i.e., PLS(x, y) =
PL(x)1 [y ≤ E [S]], for any PL(x).
In words, this result states that the critical attack size can
never be larger than the ratio of mean free space to mean
capacity. In addition, this optimal p? value can be achieved
by assigning every line the same free-space, i.e., by setting
S1 = · · · = SN = E [S], regardless of how loads are distributed.
Thus far, we have seen that the equal distribution of free
space leads to the largest possible critical attack size, hereafter
denoted p?opt. It is clear that the final system size after an
attack of size p is at most 1 − p. With this in mind, the next
result establishes the optimality of the Dirac-delta distribution
of free-space in the sense of maximizing the robustness of
power systems uniformly over all attack sizes.
Theorem 3.4 ([36]): With S1 = S2 = · · · = SN we have
n∞(p) =
{
1 − p for p < p?opt
0 for p ≥ p?opt
Hence, the Dirac-delta distribution of free-space S maximizes
n∞(p) over the entire range 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
These findings suggest that under the equal flow-
redistribution model considered here, power systems with
homogeneous distribution of redundant space are more robust
against random attacks and failures, as compared to systems
with heterogeneous distribution of redundancy. Interestingly,
this suggests that the optimal robustness is achieved when
the tolerance factor αi = Si/Li decreases with increasing
load, leading to the counter-intuitive conclusion that the lines
carrying the highest load should have the smallest tolerance
factor to achieve maximum robustness; see [36] for a more
detailed discussion on this matter.
IV. THE OPTIMAL ATTACK PROBLEM AND INSIGHTS
While existing results in [36], [29] shed some light on the
robustness under the equal flow redistribution model, many
real-world threats to power systems would be expected to
come from powerful adversaries targeting specific parts of
the grid to inflict maximum damage on the overall system.
In order to understand the system’s robustness against such
targeted attacks and to reveal its most vulnerable lines, we
now consider the problem from an adversary’s perspective
and seek effective strategies for attacking the system under
given constraints. In particular, we consider a scenario where
the adversary has full information about the system and aims
to find the best set of k of lines to attack so that it fails
maximum number of lines as a result cascading failures. This
optimization problem is formally introduced next.
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Fig. 2. In this example we have (load, capacity) values given by (8, 8 +
 ), (6, 8+  ), (4, 4+ 14/3+  ), (2, 11+  ), (1, 21+  ) where  > 0 is arbitrarily
small. The greedy maximum-load attack will need to attack k = 5 containers
to fail all. It will start attacking the leftmost container with load L1 = 8 which
will not lead to any further failures. Then, it will continue with the second one
from the left, again unable to trigger a cascade, and continue until attacking all
containers directly. The optimal solution can be seen to be k = 1 by attacking
the last container, which will trigger a cascading failure destroying the whole
system. We can generalize this counterexample to the case with N containers
with the greedy algorithm’s output being k = N while the optimal solution
being k = 1.
A. The Main Optimization Problem: ER-k
The Equal Redistribution (ER) problem with k attacks is
the optimization problem, denoted ER-k, that aims to find the
set A of k lines such that attacking A leads to the maximum
number of total line failures (as a result of load redistribution
and cascading failures), among all possible attack sets with
size k. Put differently, we seek to find A with |A| = k that
minimizes n∞(A). Throughout, we find it useful to consider
the decision version of this optimization problem (referred to
as the ER-k-k ′ problem) formally defined as follows.
INPUT: N pairs of non-negative numbers in the form
(Li,Ci) indicating the load and the capacity of each line, and
integers k and k ′ such that 0 < k < k ′ ≤ N . We assume
Ci > Li so that no line fails initially at its own load.
OUTPUT: The answer to whether or not there is an attack
set A with size k, such that at the end of the cascading failures
the number of failed nodes is at least k ′; i.e., whether there
exists A with |A| = k and n∞(A) ≤ N − k ′.
B. Heuristic Algorithms that Fail
Here we will present three intuitive greedy algorithms and
give concrete examples demonstrating their poor performance
for the optimization problem described above. In doing so, we
will focus on the special case where k ′ = N meaning that the
goal of the attack is to destroy the whole system, by attacking
a minimum number k of lines.
In what follows, we find it useful to describe the problem
in a simpler way, where we have N water containers with
capacities C1, . . . ,CN , and initial water levels L1, . . . , LN . As
in the equal flow-redistribution model, when a container is
"attacked" its content is redistributed equally to the remaining
containers. Also, if the water level in a container exceeds
its capacity, we assume that it has failed and redistribute its
content, again equally, to the remaining containers. With this
formulation, the goal of the attackers is to find the smallest
number k of containers to target so that all containers get
overloaded and fail eventually.
An important observation is that the following intuitive
algorithms can deviate significantly from the optimal solution.
Fig. 3. Consider 2n + 1 containers where (load, capacity) values are given by
(, M) for the first n containers and (M−2, M− ) for the last n+1 containers;
here  > 0 is arbitrarily small and M > 2(n + 1) . The greedy max-capacity
attack will need to attack k = n + 1 containers to fail the all containers; it will
start attacking the first n containers but cascading failures will not take place.
On the other hand, the optimal solution is k = 1 as it takes to attack only one of
the containers with (M − 2, M −  ) to trigger a cascading failure that will fail
all.
a) Greedy max-load attack: This greedy strategy aims
to maximize the load that will be redistributed in each
attack round. Namely, it starts by attacking the container
with the highest load, and proceeds similarly, waiting after
every attack for a steady-state to be reached (meaning that
all load redistribution and potential further failures end). The
algorithm stops when all containers fail. This strategy is not
optimal in general because it fails to recognize the opportunity
to eliminate containers with very large capacities that will
otherwise be difficult to fail by redistributing the load. The
worst-case deviation from the optimal (in terms of the number
of lines needed to be attacked for complete system failure) is
Θ(n); e.g., see Figure 2.
b) Greedy max-capacity attack: This strategy is similar
in spirit with the greedy max-load attack except that this time
the container with the maximum capacity is attacked in each
round. The idea here is that by taking out large containers, the
remaining, supposedly small, containers will be destroyed due
to load redistribution. This strategy is not in general optimal
either, because there may be containers with large capacities
but small (or, even almost zero) loads, rendering an attack to
such containers very ineffective in terms of triggering failures
by means of load redistribution. The worst-case deviation from
the optimal is again Θ(N) as demonstrated in Figure 3.
c) Greedy max-free-space attack: It is clear from the
previous two cases that the optimal attack strategy will be one
that considers both the loads and capacities of the containers
involved. The greedy approach that targets containers with
largest free space (i.e., (capacity − load) difference) falls
into this category, and is based on the fact that containers
with largest free space will fail the latest in the course of a
cascading failure; e.g., see Section IV-C for a discussion of
this fact. Therefore, it is sensible to eliminate those containers
with a direct attack. On the other hand, containers with small
free space are already on the verge of failing and therefore can
be taken down by means of redistribution of loads. Although
this greedy strategy is intuitive (and in fact optimal in some
special cases), it fails to be the optimal solution in general. The
main reason is that this approach does not take into account the
loads of the containers directly. For example, a container may
have a large free space but its load may be negligible compared
to other containers, rendering a direct attack on this container
ineffective. The worst-case deviation from the optimal is again
Θ(N) as demonstrated in Figure 4.
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Fig. 4. In this example we have n containers with (load, capacity) values
(, (n + 1) ) for the first n − 1 containers and (M, M + (n − 1) ) for the last
container, where  > 0 is arbitrarily small and M satisfies M > (n2 − n) .
The greedy max free-space (C − L) attack will output k = n since it will start
attacking the leftmost containers and no cascading failures will take place. The
optimal solution is obviously k = 1 by attacking the last container.
C. Observations towards Designing a Smart Algorithm
We now present some observations that will be useful in
designing a smart attack algorithm.
a) The order of attack does not matter: In the equal
redistribution model, the order with which we launch an attack
does not affect the final set of failed containers. This is because
the load of the attacked nodes will be distributed to all of the
remaining nodes so at the end an amount of
∑
i∈A Li will end
up in the remaining containers (leading to new failures or not)
irrespective of the order we chose to attack the containers in
A. We remark that an attack strategy can still be designed in
a greedy fashion, where the set A is determined one member
at a time, waiting for cascades to stop after each attack.
b) Order of failures during the cascading process:
Assume that containers are sorted by increasing free space,
Si = (Ci − Li). Given that any failed load is redistributed
equally among the remaining containers, it is clear that this
ordering will remain the same throughout the course of cas-
cading failures; the containers that are attacked directly at the
beginning are excluded from this argument. Therefore, in the
process of recursive load redistribution, containers will fail
(due to their free space diminishing to (below) zero) in this
exact same order: the one with smallest free space will fail
first, and so on and so forth.
V. OPTIMAL ATTACK STRATEGIES UNDER SPECIAL CASES
We now present three special cases of the ER-k problem
and provide optimal attack strategies for each of them.
a) Same Loads: An interesting situation arises when
initial loads are the same for all containers while capacities
differ. This reflects situations in which all lines in the power
system are given the same initial load, but have different
capacities owing to the physical constraints or material used.
We show that a greedy algorithm finds the optimal solution in
this special case. The ER-k-Same Loads Problem is defined
formally as follows.
INPUT: A non-negative rational number L for the common
load and a list of N non-negative numbers Ci > L, ∀i
indicating the capacity of each line. The integer k represents
the number of attacks we can launch.
OUTPUT: The set A of lines to be attacked that minimizes
n∞(A) under the constraint |A| = k.
The next result, proved in Supplementary Material, shows
that the max-C-greedy algorithm finds the optimal solution.
Theorem 5.5: The max-C-Greedy Algorithm is optimal for
the ER-k-Same Loads Problem.
b) Same Free Spaces: Sometimes it might be the case
that the containers have arbitrary load and capacity but they
have a fixed free space. In [36], this was in fact shown to
be the optimal design that gives maximum robustness against
random attacks. We refer to the corresponding problem as the
ER-k-Same Free Spaces, formally defined as follows.
INPUT: A list of N non-negative rational numbers Li indicat-
ing the load of each container and a positive rational number
S indicating the common free space.
OUTPUT: Find the minimum number k of containers needed
to be attacked in order to destroy the whole system.
We changed the output from having a fixed number of lines
to be attacked to inflict the maximum damage, to the case
where we aim to destroy the whole system with the minimum
number of attacks. This is because in the case where every
container has the same free space, there are no intermediate
cascading failures. After an attack, the system will either fail
completely, or no single line will fail other than those attacked
directly. We show in Supplementary Material that the max-L-
Greedy algorithm that targets lines with the largest loads leads
to the optimal solution for this problem.
Theorem 5.6: The max-L-Greedy Algorithm is optimal for
the ER-k-Same Free Spaces Problem.
c) Capacities Proportional to Loads: In many cases,
the capacities and the loads of power lines are related in a
particular way. Namely, the capacity of a line is often set to
be proportional to its load. For example with α > 0 denoting
the tolerance factor, we have Ci = (1 + α)Li for each line
i = 1, . . . , N . In this variation, we will also show that there is
a greedy algorithm achieving the optimal solution. The ER-k-
(C ∝ L) Problem is defined formally as follows.
INPUT: A list of N non-negative numbers Li indicating the
load of each container and a positive number α such that
container capacities are set to Ci = (1 + α)Li for each i.
OUTPUT: The set A of lines to be attacked that minimizes
n∞(A) under the constraint |A| = k.
In this setting, load, free-space, and capacity of the lines
will be ordered in the same way, and as we show in the
Supplementary Material, max-L,C, S-Greedy algorithms that
target lines with the largest load and free-space and capacity
give the optimal solution to this problem.
Theorem 5.7: The max-L,C, S-Greedy Algorithms are opti-
mal for the ER-k-(C ∝ L) Problem.
VI. A MODIFIED OPTIMAL ATTACK PROBLEM WITH TOTAL
LOAD CONSTRAINTS
In this Section, we will prove that a variation of the decision
problem ER-k-k ′ is NP-Complete. In particular, we consider
the ER-k-k ′-Q problem, defined formally as follows.
INPUT: N pairs of non-negative numbers in the form
(Li,Ci) indicating the load and the capacity of each line,
integers k and k ′ such that 0 < k < k ′ ≤ N , and a positive
number Q. We also assume Ci > Li for each i = 1, . . . , N .
OUTPUT: The answer to whether or not there is an attack
set A with size k, and total sum of loads
∑
i∈A Li ≤ Q, such
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that at the end of the cascading failures the number of failed
nodes is at least k ′; i.e., whether there exists A ⊂ {1, . . . , N}
with |A| = k, ∑i∈A Li ≤ Q, and n∞(A) ≤ N − k ′.
It is clear that the objective is two-fold here and that there
is an inherent trade-off: by attacking lines with larger initial
loads we can shed more load on other lines and have a better
chance to trigger a cascade of failures that would destroy the
whole system. However, the problem enforces a constraint on
the total load of the attacked containers as well. This knapsack-
like trade-off is what makes the problem NP-complete as we
now show. Our proof is based on the reduction of the ER-k-k ′-
Q problem from the k-Subset Sum variant defined as follows:
Given a set of integers and a target sum Q, is there any subset
of size k whose sum is Q?
Theorem 6.8: The ER-k-k ′-Q Problem is NP-Complete.
Proof. First, we show that ER-k-k ′-Q Problem is in NP: The
certificate is a list of the k containers we choose to attack.
We can check in polynomial time (e.g., see the ER-Attack
Projection algorithm in [4]) whether at least k ′ lines in the
system fail or not. Since we have a certificate that can be
checked in polynomial time, ER-k-k ′-Q is in NP!
Given an instance of the k-Subset Sum problem we will
create an instance of the ER-k-k ′-Q problem: Given a set of N
integers a1, a2, ..., aN , the k-Subset Sum problem asks whether
there exists k members of the set whose some equals Q. If
k = N , we can check if
∑N
i=1 ai = Q and respond accordingly.
From now on, we suppose k < N and create an equivalent
version of the ER-k-k ′-Q problem in the following manner.
Let lines L1, . . . ,LN have loads L1 = a1, L2 = a2, ..., LN = aN
and consider the ER-k-k ′-Q problem; i.e., we seek to find a
set A of k lines such that
∑
i∈A Li ≤ Q and that attacking A
leads to failure of at least k ′ > k lines in the system. We also
set Ci = Li + Si where the free space is Si =
Q
N−k for each
i = 1, . . . , N . This last constraint ensures two things. First,
as discussed in Section V, when all lines have the same free
space then attacking k lines can only have two consequences:
either only those k lines that are attacked fail, or all N lines
fail. In either case, there is no cascade of failures and the
system reaches a steady-state immediately. Thus, with equal
free space among all lines, the ER-k-k ′-Q problem with k ′ >
k is equivalent to ER-k-N-Q problem. Secondly, under the
enforced assumptions it is clear that a complete system failure
will take place if and only if the total load failed by the initial
attack A is larger than the sum of the free spaces of those that
are not in the attack set A; i.e., if and only if∑
i∈A
Li ≥
∑
j∈{1,...,N }/A
Sj = (N − k) QN − k = Q.
Here, the first equality follows from the facts that |A| = k
and Si =
Q
N−k for each i = 1, . . . , N . Recalling further the
constraint that
∑
i∈A Li ≤ Q, this leads to
∑
i∈A Li = Q.
Therefore, the created instance of the ER-k-k ′-Q problem
indeed seeks to find a subset A of {a1, . . . , aN } such that
|A| = k and ∑i∈A Li = Q, rendering it equivalent to the
k-Subset Sum instance that we have started with. For the
reverse direction, assume that the ER-k-k ′-Q problem has a
solution with k lines L(1), . . . ,L(k). Then the loads of these
lines constitute a solution to the k-Subset-Sum problem.
The above reduction can be constructed in polynomial time
(more precisely, in linear time), so if there was a polynomial
algorithm that could solve the ER-k-k ′-Q, then the k-Subset
Sum would be in P, which is wrong unless P=NP. Thus, we
conclude that the ER-k-k ′-Q Problem is NP-complete.
An important implication of the above result is that the
optimization version of the ER-k-k ′-Q problem, which seeks
to find the set A of lines that minimizes n∞(A) under the
constraints |A| = k and ∑i∈A Li ≤ Q, is NP-Hard. This means
that under these constraints, the adversary can not launch an
optimal attack in polynomial time unless P=NP.
VII. HEURISTIC ALGORITHMS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE
Although, it is not known whether the original optimization
problem of finding the best k lines to attack to minimize final
system size is NP-Hard or not, the discussion in the preceding
section indicates that the optimal attack problem is likely to
be computationally challenging; in particular, we know that
the problem is NP-Hard if we are further constrained by the
total load of those we can attack. This prompts us to develop
heuristic algorithms, for both the original and the modified
optimization problems, that work in polynomial time and
have competitive performance under arbitrary load-capacity
distributions. The performance of these heuristics will then
be compared with some benchmark heuristics such as max-L,
max-C, max-S, and random attacks.
In the interest of brevity and concreteness, the discussion is
restricted here to non-greedy algorithms that choose the attack
set A without ever running the attack projection algorithm.
In other words, the algorithms are not allowed to run the
cascading failures initiated by a subset of A, and then continue
making the remaining selections from the lines that survived
the cascade. Of course, all heuristics considered here including
the benchmarks can be modified to operate in a greedy fashion.
One might also be tempted to use a greedy algorithm where,
at each round, the line to be attacked is chosen in an optimal
way; i.e., the line whose failure leads to smallest number
of surviving lines is chosen from among all lines that are
still alive. However, for the problem at hand, one can realize
that unless |A| is relatively large, the final system size equals
n∞(A) = N − |A| regardless of the set A of attacked lines. For
example, with |A| = k, this will be the case whenever
k ≤ Smin
Lmax
(N − k),
meaning that if Smin/Lmax > 0, the greedy heuristic will have
to deal with ties when making its choices for the next line to
be attacked until it makes Ω(n) choices. Since resolving the
ties by randomization for such a large number of selections
is likely to lead to poor performance, one needs heuristic
rules to resolve the ties. Even then, our preliminary simulation
study indicated that the greedy versions of the heuristics
considered here perform only slightly better than their non-
greedy counterparts, and the comparison among the greedy
heuristics provided no additional insight to what was already
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observed from non-greedy algorithms; hence the decision to
consider only non-greedy attack strategies here.
A. Heuristics for the original optimization problem
We first consider the original case where there is no con-
straint on the total load of the lines that can be attacked; i.e.,
we consider the ER-k problem. Let A be the set of lines to
be attacked such that |A| = k. It is clear from the previous
discussions that a good attack should aim to
maximize
∑
i∈A
Li, and (6)
minimize Sj, j ∈ {1, . . . , N} − A (7)
In words, the attack should aim to find the lines with the largest
free space while making the total load of the failed lines as
large as possible. Thus, the attack should intuitively look for
lines with large initial load and large free-space. Of course,
most difficult situations arise when the load and free-space
values of the lines are in reverse order; e.g., the highest load
carrying line has the smallest free-space, etc. as in Figure 2.
Our main idea towards handling the trade-off described
above is based on its similarities with the well-studied 0-1
Knapsack problem. In the 0-1 Knapsack problem, we are given
a set of N items, {1, . . . , N}, each with a weight wi and a value
vi , and the goal is to choose items such that their total value
is maximized while the total weight is bounded by W ; i.e.,
maximize
∑
i
vi xi (8)
subject to
∑
i
wi xi ≤ W and xi ∈ {0, 1} (9)
The 0-1 Knapsack problem is known to be NP-Hard, but
polynomial-time heuristics can still give close-to-optimal so-
lutions. For example, a competitive heuristic is to order the
items based on their "value per weight", i.e., vi/wi , and choose
items according to this order, starting with the one with the
highest vi/wi , until the total weight capacity W is reached.
In fact, with a small modification to handle corner cases, this
heuristic is known to yield at least 50% of the optimum value.
The optimal attack problem we consider, i.e., the ER-k
problem, has some similarities with but is not equivalent to
the 0-1 Knapsack problem. In particular, one can construct an
analogy between the constraints of the 0-1 Knapsack problem
and the ER-k problem by assigning all item weights as wi = 1
and the total weight limit to be W = k. However, the objectives
(6)-(7) of the ER-k problem are much more complex than the
objective (8) of the Knapsack problem. Nevertheless, the two
problems have some similarity in that their main difficulties lie
in the trade-offs involved. In the Knapsack problem the trade-
off is between the value and the weight of the item and it is
desirable to pick items with high value and low weight, while
in the ER-k, the trade-off lies between the possibly conflicting
objectives of choosing lines with high load and high free-
space. Inspired with the efficient heuristic for the Knapsack
problem that is based on selecting items with the largest vi/wi
ratio (i.e., items with the biggest bang for the buck), our first
heuristic for the ER-k problem is based choosing lines with
the highest load times free-space, i.e., with the highest Li ∗ Si .
a) Maximum Load×Free Space Attack: In this algorithm,
the load free space product, Li ∗ Si is computed for each line
i = 1, . . . , N . After sorting the lines based on this product, the
k lines to be attacked is chosen as the ones having the highest k
load-free space product. As mentioned above, this is inspired
by the 2-approximation heuristic for the Knapsack problem
that orders items according to vi ∗ 1wi when the goal is to
choose items with high v and low w. In the ER-k problem, we
wish to choose lines with high L and high S, or equivalently,
with high L and low 1S . Thus, constructing an analogy between
value vi and load Li , and weight (or, cost) wi and 1/Si , our
heuristic chooses lines with the maximum
Li ∗ 11/Si = Li ∗ Si .
The performance of this heuristic is demonstrated via several
numerical examples in the next subsection along with a
comparison with some benchmark heuristics.
Aside from its connection to a powerful heuristic in a
relevant problem, the maximum L ∗ S heuristic has several
advantages. First of all, this heuristic becomes equivalent to
the optimal attack strategy in the three special cases considered
in Section V; e.g., when all lines have the same load, it
chooses ones with highest free-space (and hence capacity), or
when all lines have the same free-space, it chooses lines with
maximum L, etc. Secondly, considering the product L ∗ S is
an effective way to favor lines with high load and free-space,
while heavily penalizing load or free-space values close to
zero; note that benchmark heuristics including the highest-
capacity attack (C = L + S) fail to penalize small L or C
values. In the optimal attack problem, this makes perfect sense
given that a line with almost no load should never be attacked
even if it has very high free-space since its failure will likely
not affect any other line. Similarly, it may not be a good idea
to directly attack a line with almost no free-space even if it
has very high load, since the line will likely fail due to load
redistribution regardless of which other lines are attacked.
b) Maximum L ∗Sβ attack: While maximum L ∗S attack
is intuitive and will be seen to be powerful in many cases,
we observe that its performance can be further improved by a
small modification. To this end, we propose a second heuristic
as a modified version of the max-L ∗ S attack that allows
adjusting the relative importance of load and free-space values
of the lines. In particular, with β in [0,∞], we consider a
heuristic that chooses k lines with the maximum Li ∗ Sβi .
An added benefit of this heuristic is that it contains several
heuristics as special cases. In particular, the maximum L ∗ S
algorithm described above is obviously a special case of this
algorithm, corresponding to the case β = 1. Also, by setting
β = 0, this heuristic reduces to the max-L attack, while setting
β = ∞ (or, large enough) makes it equal to the max-S attack.
B. Numerical Comparison with Benchmark Heuristics
We now compare the heuristics we developed against some
benchmark heuristic algorithms via numerical experiments.
The benchmark heuristics we will consider are given below:
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Fig. 5. The performance comparison of different heuristic algorithms for
L ∼U[10, 30], S ∼U[10, 60], N = 5000.
a) Random attack: This is the most primitive attack
strategy and considered here only for comparison purposes.
The attack picks k lines to be attacked uniformly at random
from amongst all N lines.
b) Highest-L, highest-C, highest-S attacks: These three
attacks are based on sorting lines with respect to their initial
load Li , free-space Si , or capacity Ci = Li + Si , respectively
and attacking the top k lines with the highest value of the
corresponding metric.
We fix the number of lines at N = 5000 for all ex-
periments. First, we consider the case where each line is
independently given an initial load from a uniform distribution,
U(Lmin, Lmax), where we set Lmin = 10 and Lmax = 30. The
free-space allocated to each line is generated independently
from its load, again from a uniform distribution, U(Smin, Smax)
with Smin = 10, Smax = 60. The capacity of a line Li is
given by the sum Ci = Li + Si . The independence of L and S
leads to some lines having high load but small free-space, or
vice versa, rendering the optimal attack problem non-trivial;
e.g., with these choices, the realized load-capacity values will
almost surely not fall into one of the special cases presented
in Section V where an optimal solution is available.
Under this setup, we compute the final system size as
a function of the number k of lines attacked, where the
set of attacked lines are selected according to the heuristics
considered. The results are given in Figure 5 where each data
point is obtained by averaging over 100 independent runs. We
already see in this simple setting that our attack strategy of
targeting lines with the highest L ∗ S outperforms all other
benchmarks (except a small interval of attack size where max-
L attack seems to give the highest damage). In particular, we
see that the highest L∗S attack is able to fail the whole system
by targeting 90, 180, 210, and 450 fewer lines as compared
to max-C, max-L, max-S, and random attacks, respectively.
Next, we check if this performance can be further improved
by attacking lines with highest L ∗ Sβ for some β ≥ 0. To
this end, we repeat the previous experiment as β varies from
zero to ten. The results are demonstrated in Figure 6 and as
expected show that with β = 0 or β  1, we obtain the same
performance with max-L and max-S attack, respectively. More
interestingly, we see that the case β = 1 is indeed not the best
one can do. For example, we see that when β = 0.3, the max-
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Fig. 6. The performance comparison of maximum L ∗ Sβ algorithms for
various β values for L ∼ U[10, 30], S ∼ U[10, 60], N = 5000. Inset:
The minimum number of lines needed to be attacked to fail all lines for
the maximum L ∗ Sβ attack.
L ∗ Sβ attack can fail the whole system by attacking 75 fewer
lines the case for β = 1. To demonstrate this better, we plot in
the inset of Figure 6 the minimum number lines needed to be
attacked to fail all N lines. To compute this, we again run 100
independent experiments and pick the minimum attack size
for which all 100 experiments led to entire system failure.
The performance of heuristic algorithms are known to vary
significantly under different parameter settings, and our case is
not expected to constitute an exception. To that end, we have
tested the performance of the max-L∗Sβ attack with β ∈ [0, 4],
for a wide range of possibilities for the distribution of L and S.
In all cases we considered, we were able to identify a β value
for which the max-L ∗ Sβ attack was at least as good as all
benchmark attacks (random, highest-C, L, S-attacks) showing
its versatile performance.
As already mentioned, the most challenging cases arise
when the load and free-space values are in reverse order.
To that end, we close this section by demonstrating the
performance of the max-L ∗ Sβ attack in such cases. In
particular, we start by generating L1, . . . , LN and S1, . . . , SN
independently according to some distribution. Then, the load
values (resp. free-space values) are sorted and re-arranged
in increasing (resp. decreasing) order, leading to highest-load
carrying line having the smallest free-space, and so on. To
make the problem more challenging and interesting, we also
consider Pareto distribution. Namely, a random variable X is
said to follow Pareto distribution, written X ∼ Pareto(Xmin, b)
with Xmin > 0 and b > 0, if its probability density is given by
pX (x) = Xbminbx−b−11 [x ≥ Xmin] .
To ensure that E [X] = bXmin/(b − 1) is finite, one must set
b > 1, while the variance of X is finite only if b > 2.
The results for the case where L and S values are reverse
ordered are depicted in Figure 7. Here, we show a small
number of representative results that correspond to different
behaviors for brevity. As before, all results correspond to the
minimum attack size that led to an entire system collapse in
all 100 experiments. The curves represent the results for the
max-L ∗ Sβ attack as β varies from zero to two. In each plot,
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Fig. 7. Minimum number of lines needed to be attacked to fail all lines in the
system is shown when load and free-space values are generated independently
(from the distributions given at the figure legend) and then sorted in reverse
orders; e.g., to ensure L1 ≤ L2 ≤ · · · ≤ LN , while S1 ≥ S2 ≥ · · · ≥ SN .
Curves stand for the results obtained under the max-L ∗ Sβ attack as a function
of β. Corresponding results for the max-C attack are shown by filled square
symbols, and those for the random attack by filled circles.
we add the corresponding results for the max-C attack (shown
by a filled square) and random attack (shown by a filled circle)
as well; for convenience, the x-axis values for these symbols
are chosen such that they stay on the corresponding curve
showing the results for max-L ∗ Sβ attack. We note that the
max-L attack is already demonstrated by the case β = 0 while
β = 2 gives a good indication of the performance of the max-S
attack, so these plots provide a comparison of the max-L ∗ Sβ
attack with all the benchmarks considered here.
The main observations from Figure 7 are as follows. We
see that in all cases there is a particular β value for which the
max-L ∗ Sβ attack performs the best among all benchmarks;
it is only the case of L, S ∼ Pareto(10, 1.2) where we see that
the best performance of max-L ∗ Sβ attack is attained when
β = 0, or β ∈ (0.4, 0.7) meaning that max-L attack matches
the performance of the max-L ∗ Sβ attack. Also, we see that
the β value that leads to the best performance can be equal to,
smaller than, or larger than one in different scenarios showing
the importance of trying different values of β to get the best
performance. Finally, while benchmark attacks (including the
random attack) occasionally give results close to the best max-
L ∗ Sβ attack, we see examples for each benchmark where its
performance is significantly worse than the best max-L ∗ Sβ
attack; these cases are summarized in Table I.
C. Heuristic attacks for the modified optimization problem
We now consider the modified optimization problem ER-
k-k ′-Q where the attack set A is further constrained by∑
i∈A Li ≤ Q, in addition to |A| ≤ k. As shown in Theorem
6.8, in this case finding the attack set A that minimizes the
final system size is NP-Hard, prompting us to develop heuristic
strategies. With the additional constraint on the total load of
the lines that we can attack, the trade-offs involved become
more complicated and heuristics developed in the previous
section may not be well-suited for the ER-k-k ′-Q problem.
Ultimately, our strategy should be to choose an attack set that
has k (or, very close to k) lines with total load equal (or, very
close) to Q, and that have the highest free space among all
lines. This is because at the first stage of the cascades, any
line Li that was not directly attacked will fail only if
Si ≤
∑
i∈A Li
N − |A| .
Thus, to facilitate failures it is desirable to make
∑
i∈A Li and
|A| as large as possible, while Si as small as possible.
Given the multiple constraints involved, this problems
shows similarity with the 2-dimensional 0-1 Knapsack problem
[12], [23], [25]: Consider a collection of items, where each
item i is given a value vi , has weight wi , and volume qi . The
objective is then to maximize
∑
i vi xi subject to
∑
i wi xi ≤ W
and
∑
i qi xi ≤ Q where xi ∈ {0, 1}; i.e., we want to choose
items with the maximum total value while the total weight is
limited by W and total volume is limited by Q. As can be
inferred from the discussion above, an important difference of
the ER-k-k ′-Q problem is that while it is desirable to choose
lines with high Si (could be thought to be analogous to the
“value” of the item) under given constraints, it is perhaps
equally important to attain or be very close to the limits on
both total load and total number of lines attacked.
With these in mind, our heuristics for the ER-k-k ′-Q
problem are based on incorporating a switch to the previously
developed heuristics that is actuated to ensure that the attack
set A attains or gets close to both constraints on its cardinality
and the total load. This idea is inspired from the greedy-
like heuristic developed for the multi-dimensional Knapsack
problem in [12]. This algorithm initially starts choosing items
based on a given set of rules until one or more of the
constrained resources become scarce, and then switches to a
different set of rules that favor items that use very little of
the scarce resource. Here, we propose to use a heuristic that
chooses the lines to be attacked one at a time according to the
previously developed max-L ∗ S strategy. After each selection,
we check whether the switch needs to be activated. Namely,
with A′ denoting the set of k ′ lines selected so far, we check
i) Is it still feasible to select all remaining k − k ′ lines
from the smallest load carrying lines available? Namely,
with the remaining lines’ loads sorted in ascending order
L(1) ≤ L(2) ≤ · · · ≤ L(N−k′), we check if
Distribution of Minimum # of lines to attack to fail all
L and S random max-C max-L max-S best β
L ∼ Pareto(10, 1.2)
S ∼ Pareto(10, 1.2) 981 151 71 2241 71
L ∼U(0.4, 100)
S ∼U(0.05, 150) 691 1061 2611 1021 491
L ∼ Pareto(10, 2.5)
S ∼ Pareto(8, 1.2) 1671 1611 1421 2111 1411
L ∼ Pareto(10, 1.1)
S ∼U(10, 200) 791 711 3261 2221 541
L, S from the
UK National Grid∗ 2371 1491 1611 2111 1441
TABLE I
Performance comparison of benchmark attacks with the best result of the
max-L ∗ Sβ attack. The first four rows are obtained from Figure 7, while the
last row is obtained from simulations with UK National Grid data (see Section
VIII for details). Values significantly worse (in the sense of needing to attack
many more lines to fail all) than the best-L ∗ Sβ attack are made bold.
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Fig. 8. The performance comparison of different heuristic algorithms for L ∼ U[10, 30], S ∼ U[10, 60], N = 5000, when the attack is constrained to k lines
such that their total load satisfies a) Ltot ≤ 0.25 ∗ k ∗ E[L]; b) Ltot ≤ 0.75 ∗ k ∗ E[L]; c) Ltot ≤ 1.0 ∗ k ∗ E[L]; d) Ltot ≤ 1.25 ∗ k ∗ E[L].
k−k′∑
j=1
L(j) +
∑
i∈A′
Li≤?Q
If the answer is YES, we continue with the second
condition for the switch, while if the answer is NO, the
switch is activated and algorithm is finished by appending
A′ with k − k ′ − 1 lines with the smallest load-carrying
lines available; i.e., with L(1), . . .L(k−k′−1). Alternatively,
one can release the latest added member of A′ and append
it with k − k ′ lines L(1), . . .L(k−k′); we found no major
performance difference between these two approaches.
ii) Next, check whether it is feasible to select all remaining
k − k ′ lines from the largest load carrying lines avail-
able. Namely, with the remaining lines’ loads sorted in
ascending order L(1) ≤ L(2) ≤ · · · ≤ L(N−k′), we check if
N−k′∑
N−k+1
L(j) +
∑
i∈A′
Li≤?Q
If the answer is NO, we continue the algorithm with the
next selection, while if the answer is YES, the switch is
activated and algorithm is finished by appending A′ with
k − k ′ lines with the largest load-carrying lines available;
i.e., with L(1), . . .L(k−k′−1).
The two conditions of the switch described above ensure
that while the initial selections are made in line with the
original objectives of picking lines with high load and high
free-space, care is also given so as to be able to pick k (or,
k−1) lines whose total load is close to the limit Q. Of course,
any algorithm including the benchmarks can be modified using
the switch idea to better accommodate total load constraints. In
particular, when the total load limit Q is extremely stringent,
it would be tempting to pick lines with small load so as to not
exhaust the total load limit quickly, while aiming to choose
lines with high free-space. This prompts us to consider the
max-S/L heuristic as well, including its modification with
the switch idea described above. To keep the discussion brief
we do not present results for the max-L ∗ Sβ attack (with
or without switch) and consider only the case where β = 1;
this is in part due to the fact that when the switch is added,
the performance of the max-L ∗ Sβ attack becomes much less
sensitive to variations in β over small ranges.
We now present numerical results to evaluate the perfor-
mance of the heuristic attacks developed here and compare
them against benchmark algorithms; as before, we will use
max-C, S, L and random attacks as benchmarks. Different from
the experiments conducted in Section VII-A, here we have to
vary not only the maximum number k of lines that can be
attacked, but also the limit Q on the total load of the attacked
lines. In particular, we would expect the performance of the
algorithms to depend heavily on Q. To this end, we find it
meaningful to let Q vary with k and to set it in reference to
the mean total load of k randomly selected lines; i.e., we set
Q = Q(k) = c ∗ k ∗ E[L] (10)
for some constant c > 0. This choice enables us to tune c
to different levels and check performance in cases where (i)
the total load is extremely limited (i.e., c  1); ii) total load
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Fig. 9. The performance comparison of different heuristic algorithms for L ∼U[0.4, 100], S ∼U[0.05, 150], with L and S sorted in reverse order, N = 5000,
when the attack is constrained to k lines such that their total load satisfies a) Ltot ≤ 0.25 ∗ k ∗ E[L]; b) Ltot ≤ 0.75 ∗ k ∗ E[L]; c) Ltot ≤ 1.0 ∗ k ∗ E[L]; d)
Ltot ≤ 1.25 ∗ k ∗ E[L]. Each data point is obtained by averaging over 100 independent runs.
limit is such that heuristics that do not take load into account
(such as max-S or random attacks) will likely be able to select
(close to) k lines with total load very close to Q (i.e., c ≈ 1);
or iii) total load limit is not stringent at all (i.e., c  1) and
the problem is similar to the unconstrained load case.
In the first set of experiments, we set N = 5000 and generate
load-free space values independently from the distributions
L ∼ U[10, 30] and S ∼ U[10, 60]. For brevity we consider four
values of c given at (10): c = 0.25, c = 0.75, c = 1.0, c = 1.25.
The results are presented in Figure 8 from which a number
of interesting observations can be made. When c = 0.25,
i.e., when total load is extremely constrained, we see that all
heuristics without a switch perform poorly and are not able
to fail the whole system even until k = 3000. This can be
attributed to their inability to attack the maximum allowed
number k of lines as they quickly exhaust the total load limit.
On the other hand, we see that both max-L∗S-with-switch and
max-S/L-with-switch attacks perform much better, and despite
the stringent limit on the total load are able to fail the system
by attacking about 50% more lines than required in the case
where the total load is unlimited. When c is increased to 0.75,
we see that the performance of the benchmarks improve but
still are significantly worse than the two heuristics that use the
switch; in this case we also see that the max-S/L-with-switch
attack slightly outperforms max-L ∗ S-with-switch.
With c = 1, we see that algorithms that ignore the loads
such as max-S and random attacks perform as well as they
do in the unconstrained case; this is expected by virtue of the
law of large numbers. In particular, when c = 1, we would
expect max-S to perform well since it picks the most robust
lines in the system and is likely to reach the limits k and Q
simultaneously given that L is independent from S. Figure 8(c)
confirms this intuition where we also see that both heuristics
with switch match the performance of the max-S attack.
Finally, with c = 1.25, we get close to the unconstrained
load case, and as expected see that the performance of the
max-L ∗ S algorithm becomes the best. What is interesting
here is that the max-L ∗ S-attack-with-switch is able to match
this performance, showing its versatile performance across
very different cases considered here. Overall, these experi-
ments demonstrate that incorporating the switch significantly
improves the performance and the max-L ∗ S-attack performs
well across different ranges of the total load limit.
As in Section VII-A, it is of interest to check the perfor-
mance of these algorithms in difficult cases where load and
free-space values are sorted in reverse orders. To this end, we
consider one of the settings used in Figure 7, and generate
load and free-space independently from L ∼ U[0.4, 100] and
S ∼ U[0.05, 150], and then sort them in reverse orders so that
the line with maximum load gets the smallest free-space and so
on and so forth. In this setting, max-S and max-S/L heuristics
become equivalent. Also, since large S values are around 150
while L is limited to 100, the lines with maximum-C will
be those with large S (and small L due to reverse ordering).
As seen in Figure 9, this leads to three benchmarks (max-
S,C, S/L) performing almost equally in this setting.
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We see from Figure 9 that the max-L ∗S-attack-with-switch
once again performs well. It leads to the best performance
among all heuristics considered for c = 0.25, c = 0.75, and
c = 1.0 (equal with max-L ∗ S), while coming second for
c = 1.25 after max-L ∗ S; this is expected since without a
stringent limit on total load, the problem gets closer to the
unconstrained case where a switch is not needed. Also, in this
case we see that the performance of the max-S attack (along
with max-S/L and max-C attacks) is rather unaffected by the
load constraint. We attribute this to the fact that since load and
free-space are reverse ordered, targeting max-S lines is equal
to targeting min-L lines and even when c = 0.25 the total load
limit is not likely to be exhausted easily; i.e., the algorithm is
able to choose k lines without exceeding the total load limit.
We think this is also the reason why the switch is not helping
(and, actually hurting) the max-S/L algorithm in this case.
VIII. SIMULATIONS WITH UK NATIONAL GRID DATA
In this section, we provide simulation results illustrating
how the attack strategies covered here performs when the load
and free space distribution are based on real data. We have
used National Grid Electricity Ten Year Statement 2016 Model
of Great Britain [15] to generate load-free space pairs. To be
more precise, the load distribution is chosen from the winter
peak power flow diagram presented in [15, Appendix C]. For
the free-space distribution, the transmission line ratings given
in [15, Appendix B] has been used. As in the case of previous
examples, the number of lines is taken as N = 5000.
In Figure 10, we show the performance of the heuristic algo-
rithms for the unconstrained case, i.e., for the ER-k problem.
The results are very similar to those obtained under synthetic
load-free space distributions and demonstrate that heuristics
developed here perform well under real-world distributions
as well. In particular, we see that the proposed max-L ∗ S
heuristic performs better than all benchmarks considered, and
its performance can further be improved by the max-L ∗ Sβ
attack. For the UK National Grid data, our results indicated
that the best performance is obtained when β = 1.5; see also
the last row in Table I.
Next, we consider the ER-k-k ′-Q problem where the total
load of the attack set is bounded by Q. As in Figures 8 and 9,
we set Q according to (10) for several c values, and compare
the performance of our attack strategies with benchmarks;
500 1000 1500 2000 2500
Attack size, k
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
F
in
a
l
sy
st
em
si
ze
highest S
highest L
highest C = L+ S
highest L ∗ S
highest L ∗ S1.5
random attack
Fig. 10. The performance comparison of different heuristic algorithms when
L, S follow the UK National Grid data [15].
this time the load-free space distribution is set according to
the aforementioned UK National Grid data. The results are
depicted in Figure 11. Once again we see that the max-L ∗ S
attack with switch leads to the best overall performance among
all heuristics considered; it leads to the best performance when
c = 0.25 (tied with max-S/L with switch), c = 0.75, and
c = 1.25, while coming as second for c = 1 after max-
S/L. This shows that the heuristic attacks proposed here have
versatile performance also under distributions observed in real-
world power systems.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we consider a flow-redistribution based model
to understand cascading failures in load-carrying networks,
e.g., electrical power systems, transportation systems, etc. We
focus on assessing the vulnerability of such systems against
adversarial attacks. In particular, in a system with N lines with
initial loads L1, . . . , LN and capacities C1, . . . ,CN , we study
the constrained optimization problem of finding k initial lines
to be attacked to minimize the final number of alive lines in the
system. We give optimal greedy algorithms in several special
cases, and prove that a variation of the problem (with a bound
on the total load of the initial attack set) is NP-Hard. Several
heuristics are developed and their performance is compared
with benchmark attacks under various settings. Overall, it is
seen that the system is most vulnerable against attacks that
target lines with maximum load free-space product L∗(C−L).
There are many interesting directions to consider for future
work. First, the complexity of the optimal k-attack problem
(without a bound on the total load) is not known. Also, with
the results of this paper revealing good attack strategies, one
might now seek optimal design strategies (e.g., in the form of
load-capacity distributions) that lead to maximum robustness
against such attacks. It would also be interesting to consider
new cascading failure models for flow networks that combine
local and global redistribution approaches; e.g., a portion of the
failed load is redistributed in the local neighborhood according
to network topology while the rest is redistributed globally. For
this last problem, we provide preliminary simulation results in
Supplementary Material. They suggest that the mean-field (i.e.,
equal) redistribution model captures the qualitative behavior
of system robustness well. Finally, it might be interesting
to study information cascades in social networks [27], [30],
[31], [33] using the models considered here; the optimal
attack problem studied here will then amount to influence
maximization problem [10].
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